Team:UCLondon/Human Practices
From 2012e.igem.org
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==Safety== | ==Safety== | ||
- | + | *Synthetic gene technology has developed to such an extent that now it has become easier to use and implement. Now with software available to help in design, coupled with cheapening synthetic gene services, the technological barrier is becoming even lower for normal people to engineer genes. This can be good but also bad because it will be considerably easier to engineer nasty biological product or even bioweapons. Bioterrorism will be easy to do either purposely or accidentally by not properly trained individuals playing the genes as some kind of hobby. | |
- | + | Proposed solution: track the ordering customer's identit. Pattern check the ordered synthetic sequence and prevent unlicensed customers from ordering potentially dangerous genes. | |
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- | + | *There is a misconception about codon optimization that changing the coding sequence of a wild type gene and transforming it may cause unintented products. The truth is actually the other way round. If a wild type gene is to be transformed into a foreign host, the wild type gene does already have the risk of producing unintended effect in the host. By doing rational optimization and sequence design, the unitended effects can be identified and eliminated instead. | |
Revision as of 13:54, 20 October 2012
MorphBioinformatics
Human Practices
Outreach
Coming soon to a computer near you.
Workshops
Tutorials
Safety
- Synthetic gene technology has developed to such an extent that now it has become easier to use and implement. Now with software available to help in design, coupled with cheapening synthetic gene services, the technological barrier is becoming even lower for normal people to engineer genes. This can be good but also bad because it will be considerably easier to engineer nasty biological product or even bioweapons. Bioterrorism will be easy to do either purposely or accidentally by not properly trained individuals playing the genes as some kind of hobby.
Proposed solution: track the ordering customer's identit. Pattern check the ordered synthetic sequence and prevent unlicensed customers from ordering potentially dangerous genes.
- There is a misconception about codon optimization that changing the coding sequence of a wild type gene and transforming it may cause unintented products. The truth is actually the other way round. If a wild type gene is to be transformed into a foreign host, the wild type gene does already have the risk of producing unintended effect in the host. By doing rational optimization and sequence design, the unitended effects can be identified and eliminated instead.